

## Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 164764 TOSEC 060151

NODIS

FOL REPEAT GENEVA 5472 SENT ACTION SECSTATE JULY 12, 1975

QUOTE

S E C R E T GENEVA 5472

NODIS

FOR USDEL SECRETARY PARTY BONN

FOR SONNENFELDT FROM SHERER

EO: 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE PFOR XG

SUBJ: CSCE: TURKISH PROBLEMS

1. FOLLOWING ARE CURRENT SPECIAL TURKISH PROBLEMS IN CSCE

A. MALTESE AMENDMENT -- MALTESE AMENDMENT ON "REDUCING MILITARY FORCES" IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION IS READ BY THE TURKS AS PARTLY

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DIRECTED AGAINST THEM, IN PARTICULAR IN CYPRUS CONTEXT. TURKISH

DELEGATION RECEIVED TELEPHONE INSTRUCTIONS JULY 10 TO FIRMLY OPPOSE MALTESE AMENDMENT, AND APPEALED TO US FOR UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR PROBLEM. IF FRG CAN HEAD OFF MALTESE AMENDMENT, THIS TURKISH PROBLEM WILL DISAPPEAR. (FRENCH POSITION ON THIS ISSUE MAY BE KEY, AND WE WOULD RECOMMEND DIRECT CONTACT WITH SAUVAGNARGUES.) OTHERWISE IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAKE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO MINTOFF. BEST CHANNEL FOR THIS MAY BE ROMANIAN FONMIN MACOVESCU, WHO HAS TAKEN ON AN INTERMEDIARY ROLE. USDEL IDEA FOR A COUNTER-PROPOSAL, WHICH WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT DISCUSSED OUTSIDE THE DELEGATION, IS "PROMOTING ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS IN THE REGION".

B. AREA EXCEPTION FOR MANEUVER CBM -- TURKS WANT A FRONTIER ZONE OF 100 KM (150 KM FALLBACK) FOR AREA OF NOTIFICATION FOR MANEUVER CBM. THEY ALSO WANT EXEMPTION FOR FRONTIERS WITH NON-PARTICIPATING STATES (IRAQ, SYRIA, IRAN), AND FOR PORTS FACING CYPRUS. LATTER DEMANDS HAVE BEEN MET, BUT 100 KM BORDER ZONE IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT BECAUSE SOVIETS SAY THEY WILL INSIST ON AN EQUAL ZONE, THUS UNDERCUTTING ALLIED EFFORTS TO GET PRESENT 250 KM COMMITMENT FROM SOVIETS. TURKS CLAIM CENTRAL ANATOLIA IS A "SANCTUARY" AND THEY CANNOT NOTIFY MANEUVERS THERE. WE BELIEVE ONLY FEASIBLE SOLUTION AT THIS POINT IS TO CONVINCE THE TURKS TO YIELD ON THIS ISSUE. FRL DEMARCHE WITH TURKISH CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, AND ALLIED DEMARCHES IN ANKARA, HAVE EVIDENTLY HAD SOME EFFECT, AND TURKS ARE NOW RECONSIDERING THEIR POSITION. IF THEY DO NOT GIVE UP ON THIS QUESTION, WE COULD CONSIDER TRYING TO TRADE-OFF A CONCESSION ON INDEPENDENT AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE MANEUVERS (SEE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH) IN EXCHANGE FOR THE TURKS JOINING CONSENSUS ON AREA.

C. SUB-THRESHOLD FOR AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE MANEUVERS -- TURKS PROPOSED ON JULY 8 A SPECIAL LOWER THRESHOLD (TWO BRIGADES, WHICH THEY DEFINE AS 4,000 TROOPS) FOR AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE MANEUVERS, BASED ON THEIR FEAR THAT A TWO BRIGADE AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK COULD GAIN CONTROL OF THE BOSPHORUS STRAITS. THIS PROVOKED ANGRY REACTION FROM SOVIETS, AND NATO ALLIES BELIEVE TURKISH PROPOSAL IS NON-NEGOTIABLE. WE HAVE PROPOSED TO DEPARTMENT THAT A RELATIVELY HARMLESS WAY TO ASSIST GENERAL EFFORT TO BRING TURKS AROUND ON THIS POINT WOULD BE TO AGREE TO NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE MANEUVERS OVER REGULAR THRESHOLD OF 25,000 TROOPS, BUT DEPARTMENT HAS REFUSED THIS REQUEST (STATE 163449 OF SECRET

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JULY 11). WE STILL BELIEVE AUTHORIZATION TO AGREE TO NOTIFICATION OF SUCH MANEUVERS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE DETRIMENTAL TO US INTERESTS, AND THAT IT MAY BE ONLY POINT ON WHICH WE CAN OFFER SOME FLEXIBILITY TO TURKS IN ORDER TO BRING THEM TO JOIN OVERALL CONFERENCE CONSENSUS AND AGREE TO CONVENING OF STATE III.

D. CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION AT STAGE III -- TURKS VEHEMENTLY OPPOSE PRESENCE OF MAKARIOS AT STAGE III, AND HAVE MADE DEMARCHES

FAVORING SOME FORM OF JOINT GREEK-TURKISH CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION. ON DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS WE HAVE GENTLY BUT FIRMLY DISCOURAGED THE TURKS FROM PURSUING THIS LINE, ON GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND WOULD FORCE ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES TO REITERATE THEIR RECOGNITION OF MAKARIOS REGIME AS ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS. TURKS HAVE LISTENED CAREFULLY TO THIS ARGUMENTATION, AND HAVE CEASED TALKING ABOUT CYPRUS ISSUE. TURKISH DELEGATION HEAD RECENTLY TOLD US HE THOUGHT MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR TURKS WERE IN MILITARY FIELD, AND THAT CYPRUS PROBLEM "COULD BE RESOLVED". FROM THIS WE HAVE INFERRED THAT TURKS ARE PREPARED TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON THE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE SAID NOTHING CONCRETE AND CONTINUE TO ALLUDE TO "UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS". WE BELIEVE ONLY POSSIBLE COURSE IN THIS SITUATION IS TO CONTINUE TO DISCOURAGE THE TURKS FROM OBJECTING TO MAKARIOS. IF CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARD TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY WITH REGARD TO PARTICIPATION AT STAGE III (SUCH AS INCLUSION OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN CYPRIOT DELEGATION, AND CLEARANCE OF MAKARIOS' SPEECH) WE BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED.

2. WE UNDERSTAND HARTMAN IS SEEING TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON MONDAY, JULY 14, AND ARE ALSO TRANSMITTING SUBSTANCE OF THIS TELEGRAM DIRECT TO HIM IN A SEPARATE EXDIS CABLE. DALE

UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

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